Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 6 Oct 2008 15:07:59 -0700 | From | Kees Cook <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] ELF: implement AT_RANDOM for future glibc use |
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On Mon, Oct 06, 2008 at 09:26:41PM +0200, Andi Kleen wrote: > > We're already using get_random* for stack, heap, and brk. Also, > > get_random* uses the nonblocking pool, so this is the same as if userspace > > had tried to pull bytes out of /dev/urandom, which (as I understand it) > > Yes exactly that's the problem. Think about it: do you really > need the same cryptographic strength for your mmap placement > as you need for your SSL session keys? > > And if you need true entropy for your session keys do you > still get it when it was all used for low security > purposes first?
Off-list I was just shown random32(). If AT_RANDOM used that instead, would that be acceptable?
-- Kees Cook Ubuntu Security Team
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