Messages in this thread | | | From | Paul Moore <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH -v1 1/3] SECURITY: new capable_noaudit interface | Date | Thu, 30 Oct 2008 12:46:20 -0400 |
| |
On Thursday 30 October 2008 11:29:40 am Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@redhat.com): > > Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use > > audit to make an A or B type decision instead of a security > > decision. Currently this is the case at least for filesystems when > > deciding if a process can use the reserved 'root' blocks and for > > the case of things like the oom algorithm determining if processes > > are root processes and should be less likely to be killed. These > > types of security system requests should not be audited or logged > > since they are not really security decisions. It would be possible > > to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did > > by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into > > that interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide > > complex indirection. > > > > This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and > > to not flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not > > security decisions. > > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> > > Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1. > I.e. > > #define CAP_NOAUDIT 0 > #define CAP_AUDIT 1 > > Otherwise, looks fine.
As a general rule aren't boolean arguments like this frowned upon, with variations on the function preferred, i.e. something like below?
int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap); int cap_capable_audit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
-- paul moore linux @ hp
| |