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SubjectRe: [AppArmor 00/44] AppArmor security module overview
On Monday 02 July 2007 22:15, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> AA on the other hand just fucks up VFS layering [...]

Oh come on, this claim clearly isn't justified. How on earth is passing
vfsmounts down the lsm hooks supposed to break vfs layering? We are not
proposing to pass additional information down to file systems. There is no
barrier between the vfs and lsm hooks for vfsmounts even today -- only look
at the inode_getattr hook; it already gets a vfsmount.

Without vfsmount we cannot tell where in the namespace we are, but that
information is essential for any kind of pathname based mechanism, AA or not,
and even for plain reporting.

LSM as a framework is supposed to allow different security mechanisms to be
plugged in. It isn't flexible enough for us right now, and so we are
proposing to extend it. What can be wrong about that?

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