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SubjectRe: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching
On 2007-06-22T07:19:39, Stephen Smalley <> wrote:

> > > Or can access the data under a different path to which their profile
> > > does give them access, whether in its final destination or in some
> > > temporary file processed along the way.
> > Well, yes. That is intentional.
> >
> > Your point is?
> It may very well be unintentional access, especially when taking into
> account wildcards in profiles and user-writable directories.

Again, you're saying that AA is not confining unconfined processes.
That's a given. If unconfined processes assist confined processes in
breeching their confinement, yes, that is not mediated.

You're basically saying that anything but system-wide mandatory access
control is pointless.

If you want to go down that route, what is your reply to me saying that
SELinux cannot mediate NFS mounts - if the server is not confined using
SELinux as well? The argument is really, really moot and pointless. Yes,
unconfined actions can affect confined processes.

That's generally true for _any_ security system.

> > That is an interesting argument, but not what we're discussing here.
> > We're arguing filesystem access mediation.
> IOW, anything that AA cannot protect against is "out of scope". An easy
> escape from any criticism.

I'm quite sure that this reply is not AA specific as you try to make it

> > Yes. Your use case is different than mine.
> My use case is being able to protect data reliably. Yours?

I want to restrict certain possibly untrusted applications and
network-facing services from accessing certain file patterns, because as
a user and admin, that's the mindset I'm used to. I might be interested
in mediating other channels too, but the files are what I really care
about. I'm inclined to trust the other processes.

Your use case mandates complete system-wide mediation, because you want
full data flow analysis. Mine doesn't.


Teamlead Kernel, SuSE Labs, Research and Development
SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nürnberg)
"Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes." -- Oscar Wilde

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