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SubjectRe: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching
On 2007-06-21T16:59:54, Stephen Smalley <> wrote:

> Or can access the data under a different path to which their profile
> does give them access, whether in its final destination or in some
> temporary file processed along the way.

Well, yes. That is intentional.

Your point is?

> The emphasis on never modifying applications for security in AA likewise
> has an adverse impact here, as you will ultimately have to deal with
> application mediation of access to their own objects and operations not
> directly visible to the kernel (as we have already done in SELinux for
> D-BUS and others and are doing for X). Otherwise, your "protection" of
> desktop applications is easily subverted.

That is an interesting argument, but not what we're discussing here.
We're arguing filesystem access mediation.

> Um, no. It might not be able to directly open files via that path, but
> showing that it can never read or write your mail is a rather different
> matter.

Yes. Your use case is different than mine.


Teamlead Kernel, SuSE Labs, Research and Development
SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nürnberg)
"Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes." -- Oscar Wilde

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