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    SubjectRe: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching
    On 2007-06-21T16:59:54, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:

    > Or can access the data under a different path to which their profile
    > does give them access, whether in its final destination or in some
    > temporary file processed along the way.

    Well, yes. That is intentional.

    Your point is?

    > The emphasis on never modifying applications for security in AA likewise
    > has an adverse impact here, as you will ultimately have to deal with
    > application mediation of access to their own objects and operations not
    > directly visible to the kernel (as we have already done in SELinux for
    > D-BUS and others and are doing for X). Otherwise, your "protection" of
    > desktop applications is easily subverted.

    That is an interesting argument, but not what we're discussing here.
    We're arguing filesystem access mediation.

    > Um, no. It might not be able to directly open files via that path, but
    > showing that it can never read or write your mail is a rather different
    > matter.

    Yes. Your use case is different than mine.



    Regards,
    Lars

    --
    Teamlead Kernel, SuSE Labs, Research and Development
    SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nürnberg)
    "Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes." -- Oscar Wilde

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