[lkml]   [2007]   [Mar]   [21]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: [PATCH RESEND 1/1] crypto API: RSA algorithm patch (kernel version

    > On Wed, March 21, 2007 10:15, Tasos Parisinos wrote:
    >> Protecting a TripleDES key in high security standards is not as
    >> simple as making the kernel read
    >> protected, you need a whole lot and
    >> that also means hardware (cryptomemories e.t.c)
    >> So you forget about all this overhead when you use assymetric
    > Ah, you're talking about fishing the key out of RAM here, right?
    > My point stays the same for that: If you can't read protect the
    > kernel RAM, small chance you can write protect it. And then they
    > can just bypass all signature checking you put in it anyway.

    How can one tamper (write) the kernel memory of a booted and running kernel
    without using an exploitable bug?

    I mean, you can't mess with the bzImage on flash, the secure bootloader
    boots it without
    letting someone alter the (non crypto-) memory while loading the bzImage
    on it, and then
    no-one can run something that will tamper the system or write anywhere
    on kernel memory
    without exploiting a bug

    I mean, am i missing something here?

    To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
    the body of a message to
    More majordomo info at
    Please read the FAQ at

     \ /
      Last update: 2007-03-21 14:15    [W:0.020 / U:54.928 seconds]
    ©2003-2016 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site