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SubjectRe: [PATCH RESEND 1/1] crypto API: RSA algorithm patch (kernel version

> On Wed, March 21, 2007 10:15, Tasos Parisinos wrote:
>> Protecting a TripleDES key in high security standards is not as
>> simple as making the kernel read
>> protected, you need a whole lot and
>> that also means hardware (cryptomemories e.t.c)
>> So you forget about all this overhead when you use assymetric
> Ah, you're talking about fishing the key out of RAM here, right?
> My point stays the same for that: If you can't read protect the
> kernel RAM, small chance you can write protect it. And then they
> can just bypass all signature checking you put in it anyway.

How can one tamper (write) the kernel memory of a booted and running kernel
without using an exploitable bug?

I mean, you can't mess with the bzImage on flash, the secure bootloader
boots it without
letting someone alter the (non crypto-) memory while loading the bzImage
on it, and then
no-one can run something that will tamper the system or write anywhere
on kernel memory
without exploiting a bug

I mean, am i missing something here?

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