Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 21 Mar 2007 15:07:38 +0200 | From | Tasos Parisinos <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH RESEND 1/1] crypto API: RSA algorithm patch (kernel version 2.6.20.1) |
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> On Wed, March 21, 2007 10:15, Tasos Parisinos wrote: > >> Protecting a TripleDES key in high security standards is not as >> simple as making the kernel read >> protected, you need a whole lot and >> that also means hardware (cryptomemories e.t.c) >> So you forget about all this overhead when you use assymetric >> > > Ah, you're talking about fishing the key out of RAM here, right? > My point stays the same for that: If you can't read protect the > kernel RAM, small chance you can write protect it. And then they > can just bypass all signature checking you put in it anyway. >
How can one tamper (write) the kernel memory of a booted and running kernel without using an exploitable bug?
I mean, you can't mess with the bzImage on flash, the secure bootloader boots it without letting someone alter the (non crypto-) memory while loading the bzImage on it, and then no-one can run something that will tamper the system or write anywhere on kernel memory without exploiting a bug
I mean, am i missing something here?
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