[lkml]   [2007]   [Nov]   [24]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: + smack-version-11c-simplified-mandatory-access-control-kernel.patch added to -mm tree
    On Nov 24, 2007, at 06:39:34, Crispin Cowan wrote:
    > Andrew Morgan wrote:
    >> It feels to me as if a MAC "override capability" is, if true to
    >> its name, extra to the MAC model; any MAC model that needs an
    >> 'override' to function seems under-specified... SELinux clearly
    >> feels no need for one,
    > That's not quite right. More specifically, it already has one in
    > the form of unconfined_t. AppArmor has a similar escape hatch in
    > the "Ux" permission. Its not that they don't need one, it is that
    > they already have one. They get to have one because they allow you
    > to actually write a policy that is more nuanced than "process label
    > must dominate object label".

    Actually, a fully-secured strict-mode SELinux system will have no
    unconfined_t processes; none of my test systems have any. Generally
    "unconfined_t" is used for situations similar to what AppArmor was
    designed for, where the only "interesting" security is that of the
    daemon (which is properly labelled) and one or more of the users are

    Even then "unconfined_t" is not an implicit part of the policy, it is
    explicitly given the ability to take any action on any object by
    rules in the policy, and it typically still falls under a few MLS
    labeling restrictions even in the targeted policy.

    Kyle Moffett

    To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
    the body of a message to
    More majordomo info at
    Please read the FAQ at

     \ /
      Last update: 2007-11-25 03:09    [W:0.044 / U:17.188 seconds]
    ©2003-2016 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site