lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2007]   [Nov]   [10]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: AppArmor Security Goal
On Sat, Nov 10, 2007 at 06:17:30PM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
> --- Crispin Cowan <crispin@crispincowan.com> wrote:
>
> > Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > ...
> >
> > Can you explain why you want a non-privileged user to be able to edit
> > policy? I would like to better understand the problem here.
> >
> > Note that John Johansen is also interested in allowing non-privileged
> > users to manipulate AppArmor policy, but his view was to only allow a
> > non-privileged user to further tighten the profile on a program. To me,
> > that adds complexity with not much value, but if lots of users want it,
> > then I'm wrong :)
>
> Now this is getting interesting. It looks to me as if you've implemented
> a mandatory access control scheme that some people would like to be able
> to use as a discretionary access control scheme. This is creepy after
> seeing the MCS implementation in SELinux, which is also a DAC scheme
> wacked out of a MAC scheme. Very interesting indeed.
>
hehe perhaps. There are lots of issues involved with doing something
like this and there are more important issues to address first.
I also don't see it so much of a DAC scheme as a user defining a MAC
for their own processes they don't trust. An application so confined
would not have the ability to change its confinement.
[unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature]
\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2007-11-11 04:57    [W:0.133 / U:0.036 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site