[lkml]   [2007]   [Oct]   [23]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: LSM conversion to static interface
    Quoting Jan Engelhardt (
    > On Oct 23 2007 07:44, Giacomo Catenazzi wrote:
    > >
    > >> I do have a pseudo LSM called "multiadm" at
    > >> , quoting:
    > >
    > >> Policy is dead simple since it is based on UIDs. The UID ranges can be
    > >> set on module load time or during runtime (sysfs params). This LSM is
    > >> basically grants extra rights unlike most other LSMs[1], which is why
    > >> modprobe makes much more sense here. (It also does not have to do any
    > >> security labelling that would require it to be loaded at boot time
    > >> already.)
    > >
    > >But his is against LSM design (and first agreements about LSM):
    > >LSM can deny rights, but it should not give extra permissions
    > >or bypass standard unix permissions.
    > It is just not feasible to add ACLs to all million files in /home,
    > also because ACLs are limited to around 25 entries.
    > And it is obvious I do not want <prof> to have UID 0, because
    > then you cannot distinguish who created what file.
    > So the requirement to the task is to have unique UIDs.
    > The next logical step would be to give capabilities to those UIDs.
    > *Is that wrong*? Who says that only UID 0 is allowed to have
    > all 31 capability bits turned on, and that all non-UID 0 users
    > need to have all 31 capability bits turned off?
    > So, we give caps to the subadmins (which is IMHO a natural task),
    > and then, as per LSM design (wonder where that is written) deny
    > some of the rights that the capabilities raised for subadmins grant,
    > because that is obviously too much.

    Once the per-process capability bounding set is accepted
    ( you will be able to do something

    1. Create user 'jdoe' with uid 0
    2. write a pam module which, when jdoe logs in, takes
    CAP_NET_ADMIN out of his capability bounding set
    3. Now jdoe can log in with the kind of capabilities subset
    you describe.

    It's not a perfect solution, since it doesn't allow jdoe any way at all
    to directly execute a file with more caps (setuid and file capabilities
    are subject to the capbound). So there is certainly still a place for

    To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
    the body of a message to
    More majordomo info at
    Please read the FAQ at

     \ /
      Last update: 2007-10-23 17:23    [W:0.036 / U:3.572 seconds]
    ©2003-2017 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site