Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 6 Sep 2006 23:40:29 -0700 | From | Paul Jackson <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps |
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Serge wrote: > With SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES=y, what changes is that it is possible for > a binary to be marked as granting CAP_SYS_NICE to anyone running it.
Nice explanation - it almost made sense to me. Thanks.
Sounds like this patch would slightly increase the situations under which a user task could do a cpuset attach_task on another user task ... if it had CAP_SYS_NICE, or some such, it could gain this attach_task ability that it had lacked on older kernels.
Sounds good to me.
My concern would be more if an existing user configuration stopped working when these filesystem capabilities became available to them, due to some previously ok operation becoming illegal.
As to exactly which CAP_SYS_* it is that has this power of allowing a cpuset attach_task, I don't think I really care.
I'm happy.
-- I won't rest till it's the best ... Programmer, Linux Scalability Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> 1.925.600.0401 - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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