Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 3/7] SLIM main patch | From | Alan Cox <> | Date | Thu, 24 Aug 2006 15:15:17 +0100 |
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Ar Iau, 2006-08-24 am 08:32 -0500, ysgrifennodd Serge E. Hallyn: > > You also have to deal with existing mmap() mappings and outstanding I/O. > > That she does.
I don't believe so from the patches.
> > SysV shared memory > > standard mmap controls should handle this, right?
No its rather independant of mmap
> > mmap > > She handles these.
I must have missed where it handles that.
> thread #2 is reading data from a pipe which is at a secret level, so how > will it exploit that? It can't write it to a lower integrity file...
Ok my example isn't quite right - I can create the pipes and do the blocking in other patterns to get the result I mean. The problem is that I can be blocked in a driver write() method before you raise the security level and no change at the VFS level will be early enough to stop it.
Another example would be
Type ^S thread #1 write(console, padding, internalbuffersize); write(console, secret_buffer, data) [blocks]
thread #2 sleep to be sure #1 is blocked open secret file read(secret, secret_buffer, data);
Type ^Q
By the time you raise the security level due to the action of thread #2 I'm already blocked in tty_do_write() and have passed any vfs checks.
> The revoke(2) isn't quite right semantically, because it would revoke > all users' access, right? Rather, we want one process' rights to all > files revoked, but other read/writers should still have access.
The core is the same, the question of specifically what you revoke is different.
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