Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 24 Apr 2006 08:50:03 -0700 | From | Tony Jones <> | Subject | Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview |
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On Mon, Apr 24, 2006 at 11:16:25AM -0400, Joshua Brindle wrote: > To make this much more real, the /usr/sbin/named policy that ships with > apparmor has the following line:
Ships with AppArmor where? On SuSE?
> /** r, > Thats right, named can read any file on the system, I suppose this is > because the policy relies on named being chrooted. So if for any reason > named doesn't chroot its been granted read access on the entire > filesystem. If I'm misunderstanding this policy please correct me but I > believe this shows the problem very loudly and clearly.
The d_path changes for absolute path mediation for chroot are not yet in any SuSE release. Nor are they reflected in any developed profiles (yet).
Another direction is a new security_chroot hook together with appropriate CLONE_FS tracking (inside AppArmor) to force chrooting confined tasks into a subprofile (similar to change hat). We are evaluating the options based on feedback here and from other places. Hence the RFC.
I hope this helps.
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