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SubjectRe: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview
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On Llu, 2006-04-24 at 15:26 +0200, Andi Kleen wrote:
> On Monday 24 April 2006 15:11, Joshua Brindle wrote:
>
> > Sure but if, instead, it's able to open /var/chroot/etc/shadow which is
> > a hardlink to /etc/shadow you've bought nothing. You may filter out
> > worms and script kiddies this way but in the end you are using obscurity
> > (of filesystem layout, what the policy allows, how the apps are
> > configured, etc) for security, which again, leads to a false sense of
> > security.
>
> AppArmor disallows both chroot and name space changes for the constrained
> application so the scenario you're describing cannot happen. What happens
> with unconstrained applications it doesn't care about by design.
>
> This has been covered several times in this thread already - please pay
> more attention.

There is a much simpler answer anyway, sit in a loop trying to
open /etc/shadow~ and wait for someone to change password. All the
problems about names remain because of links anyway.

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