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    SubjectRe: [RFC] Virtualization steps
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    Sam Vilain <sam@vilain.net> writes:

    >
    > We could even end up making security modules to implement standard unix
    > security. ie, which processes can send any signal to other processes.
    > Why hardcode the (!sender.user_id || (sender.user_id == target.user_id)
    > ) rule at all? That rule should be the default rule in a security module
    > chain.
    >
    > I just think that doing it this way is the wrong way around, but I guess
    > I'm hardly qualified to speak on this. Aren't security modules supposed
    > to be for custom security policy, not standard system semantics ?

    It is simply my contention that you into at least a semi custom
    configuration when you have multiple users with the same uid.
    Especially when that uid == 0.

    For guests you have to change the rule about what permissions
    a setuid root executable gets or else it will have CAP_SYS_MKNOD,
    and CAP_RAW_IO. (Unless I didn't read that code right).

    Plus all of the /proc and sysfs issues.

    Now perhaps we can sit down and figure out how to get completely
    isolated and only allow a new uid namespace when that is
    the case, but that doesn't sound to interesting.

    So at least until I can imagine what the semantics of a new uid
    namespace are when we don't have perfect isolation that feels
    like a job for a security module.

    Eric
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