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    SubjectRe: [Xen-devel] Re: [RFC, PATCH 0/24] VMI i386 Linux virtualization interface proposal
    Zachary Amsden wrote:
    > Chuck Ebbert wrote:
    >> In-Reply-To: <>
    >> On Wed, 15 Mar 2006 10:25:22 +0000, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
    >> I'd like to see a test harness implementation that has no actual
    >> hypervisor functionality and just implements the VMI calls natively.
    >> This could be used to test the interface and would provide a nice
    >> starting point for those who want to write a VMI hypervisor.
    > I was going to make one yesterday. But Fry's electronics stopped
    > carrying flashable blank PCI cards. :) Anyone know of a vendor?
    It's very practical to just patch Qemu to load a VMI rom as an option
    ROM. That makes such an example VMI ROM very practical without having
    to build a special PCI device.


    Anthony Liguori
    > It is possible to do in a software layer, although it really is a lot
    > easier to have the BIOS take care of all the fuss of finding a place
    > in low memory for you to live, setting up the various memory maps and
    > everything else for you.
    > There is enormous benefit to having such a layer - you have a very
    > power test harness, not just to make sure VMI works, but even more
    > importantly, to inspect and verify the native kernel operation as
    > well. You have a plethora of imporant hooks into the system, which
    > feed you knowledge you can not otherwise gain about which page tables
    > have been made active, when you take IRQs, where the kernel stack lives.
    > All of this is ripe for a debug harness that can verify the kernel
    > doesn't overflow the kernel stack, doesn't write to active page table
    > entries without proper accessors and subsequent invalidations, and
    > obeys the rules that are required for correctness when running under a
    > hypervisor. You probably even want to do hypervisor like things -
    > such as write protecting the kernel page tables so that you can be
    > confident there are no stray raw PTE accesses.
    > We actually found one (harmless on native) in i386, which was enabling
    > NX bit.
    > Zach
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