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SubjectRe: [openib-general] Re: madvise MADV_DONTFORK/MADV_DOFORK
Quoting r. Hugh Dickins <>:
> Subject: Re: [openib-general] Re: madvise MADV_DONTFORK/MADV_DOFORK
> On Mon, 13 Feb 2006, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> >
> > Like this then?
> Almost. I would still prefer madvise_vma to allow MADV_DONTFORK
> on a VM_IO vma, even though it must prohibit MADV_DOFORK there.
> But if Linus disagrees, of course ignore me.

I'm not sure about this point. Linus?

> Comments much better, thanks. I didn't get your point about mlock'd
> memory, but I'm content to believe you're thinking of an issue that
> hasn't occurred to me.

I'm referring to the follwing, from man mlock(2):

"Cryptographic security software often handles critical bytes like passwords
or secret keys as data structures. As a result of paging, these secrets could
be transfered onto a persistent swap store medium, where they might be
accessible to the enemy long after the security software has erased the
secrets in RAM and terminated."

Michael S. Tsirkin
Staff Engineer, Mellanox Technologies
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