Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 9 Nov 2006 08:50:20 -0600 | From | "Bill O'Donnell" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps |
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On Thu, Nov 09, 2006 at 10:33:49AM +0100, Chris Friedhoff wrote: | Page http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html updated ... | Kernel 2.6.18.2 updated ... | System keeps on humming ... | Is anyone else using/testing the patch? Please give feedback ... | Thanks ... I am just starting to test it out. I'll let you know how it goes. Thanks! Bill
| | Chris | | | On Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:10:21 -0600 | "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote: | | > Sorry, I should have noticed and fixed this much sooner. This | > patch is against the latest full fscaps patch which I'm replying | > to. | > | > From: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> | > Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 00:01:49 -0600 | > Subject: security: file caps: fix unused variable warnings | > | > Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security | > when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean | > up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper | > function. | > | > Rename vfs_cap_data_struct to remove redundant '_struct'. | > | > Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> | > --- | > security/commoncap.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- | > 1 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) | > | > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c | > index 6f5e46c..4b50b4d 100644 | > --- a/security/commoncap.c | > +++ b/security/commoncap.c | > @@ -109,16 +109,17 @@ void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct | > target->cap_permitted = *permitted; | > } | > | > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES | > #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" | > #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX | > -struct vfs_cap_data_struct { | > +struct vfs_cap_data { | > __u32 version; | > __u32 effective; | > __u32 permitted; | > __u32 inheritable; | > }; | > | > -static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap) | > +static inline void convert_to_le(struct vfs_cap_data *cap) | > { | > cap->version = le32_to_cpu(cap->version); | > cap->effective = le32_to_cpu(cap->effective); | > @@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ static inline void convert_to_le(struct | > cap->inheritable = le32_to_cpu(cap->inheritable); | > } | > | > -static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data_struct *cap) | > +static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_cap_data *cap) | > { | > int i; | > | > @@ -149,39 +150,14 @@ static int check_cap_sanity(struct vfs_c | > return 0; | > } | > | > -int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | > +/* Locate any VFS capabilities: */ | > +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | > { | > struct dentry *dentry; | > ssize_t rc; | > - struct vfs_cap_data_struct cap_struct; | > + struct vfs_cap_data cap_struct; | > struct inode *inode; | > | > - /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */ | > - | > - cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable); | > - cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted); | > - cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective); | > - | > - /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root | > - * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three | > - * capability sets for the file. | > - * | > - * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable | > - * and permitted sets of the executable file. | > - */ | > - | > - if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) { | > - if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) { | > - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable); | > - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted); | > - } | > - if (bprm->e_uid == 0) | > - cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective); | > - } | > - | > -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES | > - /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */ | > - | > dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); | > inode = dentry->d_inode; | > if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr) { | > @@ -216,9 +192,42 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FS_CAPABILITIES | > bprm->cap_permitted = cap_struct.permitted; | > bprm->cap_inheritable = cap_struct.inheritable; | > | > -#endif | > return 0; | > } | > +#else | > +static int set_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | > +{ | > + return 0; | > +} | > +#endif | > + | > +int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) | > +{ | > + /* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */ | > + | > + cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable); | > + cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted); | > + cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective); | > + | > + /* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root | > + * executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three | > + * capability sets for the file. | > + * | > + * If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable | > + * and permitted sets of the executable file. | > + */ | > + | > + if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) { | > + if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) { | > + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable); | > + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted); | > + } | > + if (bprm->e_uid == 0) | > + cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective); | > + } | > + | > + return set_file_caps(bprm); | > +} | > | > void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) | > { | > -- | > 1.4.1 | > | | | -------------------- | Chris Friedhoff | chris@friedhoff.org | - | To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in | the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org | More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
-- Bill O'Donnell SGI 651.683.3079 billodo@sgi.com - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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