lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2006]   [Nov]   [8]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: RFC PATCH: apply security_syslog() only to the syslog() syscall, not to /proc/kmsg
* Sergey Vlasov (vsu@altlinux.ru) wrote:
> Then what would you think about another solution:
>
> 1) When sys_syslog() is called with commands 2 (read) or 9 (get unread
> count), additionally call security_syslog(1) to check that the
> process has permissions to open the kernel log. This change by
> itself will not make any difference, because all existing
> implementations of the security_ops->syslog hook treat the operation
> codes 1, 2 and 9 the same way.
>
> 2) Change cap_syslog() and dummy_syslog() to permit commands 2 and 9
> for unprivileged users, in addition to 3 and 10 which are currently
> permitted. This will not really permit access through sys_syslog()
> due to the added security_syslog(1) check, but if a process somehow
> got access to an open file descriptor for /proc/kmsg, it would be
> able to read from it. Also, because selinux_syslog() is not
> changed, under SELinux the process will still need to have
> additional privileges even if it has /proc/kmsg open.

It's a bit clumsy in the extra caveats for sys_syslog and cap_syslog,
but does achieve what you're after. We lose default checking on the
actual read access, but perhaps this is a fair tradeoff. Stephen,
James do you have any issues with this for SELinux?

thanks,
-chris
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2006-11-09 05:13    [W:0.107 / U:0.168 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site