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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps
    On Fri, 2006-11-03 at 14:00 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
    > Quoting chris friedhoff (
    > > The patch applies cleanly , compiles and runs smoothly against
    > >
    > > I'm running slackware-current with a kernel on an ext3
    > > filesystem.
    > >
    > > Background why I use the patch:
    > > With 2.6.18 to create a tuntap interface CAP_NET_ADMIN is required.
    > > Qemu uses tuntap to create a tap interface as a virtual net interface.
    > > Instead now running qemu with root privileges to give it the right
    > > to create a tap interface, i granted qemu with the help of the patch and
    > > Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools the cap-net_admin capability. So qemu
    > > runs again without root privilege but has now the right to create the
    > > tap interface.
    > >
    > > Thanks for the patch. It reduces my the need of suid-bit progs.
    > > It should be given a spin in -mm.
    > One question is, if this were to be tested in -mm, do we want to keep
    > this mutually exclusive from selinux through config, or should selinux
    > stack on top of this?

    Given that SELinux already stacks with capability and you aren't using
    the security fields (last I looked), it would seem trivial to enable
    stacking with fscaps (just add a few secondary_ops calls to the SELinux
    hooks, right?).

    Stephen Smalley
    National Security Agency

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      Last update: 2006-11-03 21:33    [W:0.023 / U:2.188 seconds]
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