[lkml]   [2006]   [Nov]   [3]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps
On Fri, 2006-11-03 at 14:00 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting chris friedhoff (
> > The patch applies cleanly , compiles and runs smoothly against
> >
> > I'm running slackware-current with a kernel on an ext3
> > filesystem.
> >
> > Background why I use the patch:
> > With 2.6.18 to create a tuntap interface CAP_NET_ADMIN is required.
> > Qemu uses tuntap to create a tap interface as a virtual net interface.
> > Instead now running qemu with root privileges to give it the right
> > to create a tap interface, i granted qemu with the help of the patch and
> > Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools the cap-net_admin capability. So qemu
> > runs again without root privilege but has now the right to create the
> > tap interface.
> >
> > Thanks for the patch. It reduces my the need of suid-bit progs.
> > It should be given a spin in -mm.
> One question is, if this were to be tested in -mm, do we want to keep
> this mutually exclusive from selinux through config, or should selinux
> stack on top of this?

Given that SELinux already stacks with capability and you aren't using
the security fields (last I looked), it would seem trivial to enable
stacking with fscaps (just add a few secondary_ops calls to the SELinux
hooks, right?).

Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to
More majordomo info at
Please read the FAQ at

 \ /
  Last update: 2006-11-03 21:33    [W:0.028 / U:10.104 seconds]
©2003-2018 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site