lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2006]   [Nov]   [20]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
    /
    Date
    From
    SubjectRe: [PATCH 12/19] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be overridden
    Stephen Smalley wrote:
    > On Tue, 2006-11-14 at 16:19 -0500, James Morris wrote:
    >> On Tue, 14 Nov 2006, David Howells wrote:
    >>
    >>> +static u32 selinux_set_fscreate_secid(u32 secid)
    >>> +{
    >>> + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
    >>> + u32 oldsid = tsec->create_sid;
    >>> +
    >>> + tsec->create_sid = secid;
    >>> + return oldsid;
    >>> +}
    >> The ability to set this needs to be mediated via MAC policy.
    >>
    >> See selinux_setprocattr()
    >
    > That's different - selinux_set_fscreate_secid() is for internal use by a
    > kernel module that wishes to temporarily assume a particular fscreate
    > SID, whereas selinux_setprocattr() handles userspace writes
    > to /proc/self/attr nodes. Imposing a permission check here makes no
    > sense.
    >

    Since that discussion last week I have been thinking about this and I
    have to say I agree with Steve. This should be a kernel only mechanism
    for impersonating another SID - controlling the setting of process
    attributes shouldn't be restricted as this will only lead to
    inconsistencies in those attributes.

    Karl
    -
    To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
    the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
    More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
    Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

    \
     
     \ /
      Last update: 2006-11-20 20:59    [W:2.863 / U:0.012 seconds]
    ©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site