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SubjectRe: [PATCH 12/19] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be overridden
Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, 2006-11-14 at 16:19 -0500, James Morris wrote:
>> On Tue, 14 Nov 2006, David Howells wrote:
>>> +static u32 selinux_set_fscreate_secid(u32 secid)
>>> +{
>>> + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
>>> + u32 oldsid = tsec->create_sid;
>>> +
>>> + tsec->create_sid = secid;
>>> + return oldsid;
>>> +}
>> The ability to set this needs to be mediated via MAC policy.
>> See selinux_setprocattr()
> That's different - selinux_set_fscreate_secid() is for internal use by a
> kernel module that wishes to temporarily assume a particular fscreate
> SID, whereas selinux_setprocattr() handles userspace writes
> to /proc/self/attr nodes. Imposing a permission check here makes no
> sense.

Since that discussion last week I have been thinking about this and I
have to say I agree with Steve. This should be a kernel only mechanism
for impersonating another SID - controlling the setting of process
attributes shouldn't be restricted as this will only lead to
inconsistencies in those attributes.

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