Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 20 Nov 2006 14:56:15 -0500 | From | Karl MacMillan <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 12/19] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be overridden |
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Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Tue, 2006-11-14 at 16:19 -0500, James Morris wrote: >> On Tue, 14 Nov 2006, David Howells wrote: >> >>> +static u32 selinux_set_fscreate_secid(u32 secid) >>> +{ >>> + struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security; >>> + u32 oldsid = tsec->create_sid; >>> + >>> + tsec->create_sid = secid; >>> + return oldsid; >>> +} >> The ability to set this needs to be mediated via MAC policy. >> >> See selinux_setprocattr() > > That's different - selinux_set_fscreate_secid() is for internal use by a > kernel module that wishes to temporarily assume a particular fscreate > SID, whereas selinux_setprocattr() handles userspace writes > to /proc/self/attr nodes. Imposing a permission check here makes no > sense. >
Since that discussion last week I have been thinking about this and I have to say I agree with Steve. This should be a kernel only mechanism for impersonating another SID - controlling the setting of process attributes shouldn't be restricted as this will only lead to inconsistencies in those attributes.
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