Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 29 Oct 2006 11:10:16 +0200 | From | Avi Kivity <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 6/13] KVM: memory slot management |
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Arnd Bergmann wrote: >> It can shoot not only its foot, but anything the monitor's uid has >> access to. Host files, the host network, other guests belonging to the >> user, etc. >> > > Yes, that's what I meant. It's obviously nicer if the guest can't do that, > but it's a tradeoff of the potential security impact against on how hard > it is to implement hiding the addresses you don't want your guest to see. > To put it into other words, do you want the optimal performance, or the > optimal security? > >
Well, isolation is one of the most significant features of full virtualization, both for security and reliability. I don't think we can compromise that.
>> It's worse than I thouht: tlb entries generated by guest accesses are >> tagged with the guest virtual address, to if you remove a guest >> physical/host virtual page you need to invalidate the entire guest tlb. >> > > Ok, so it's the HW's fault. They either copied bad or decided doing the > s390 approach was too expensive. >
x86 tradition is to make all possible mistakes before getting a working solution.
-- error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
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