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SubjectRe: Shared memory usage

On Mon, 16 Jan 2006 wrote:

> On Mon, 16 Jan 2006 09:15:16 EST, "linux-os (Dick Johnson)" said:
>> But the customer complained during certification testing
>> that shared memory in use is not measured and therefore
>> cannot be verified. This means that there may be rogue
>> communications channels, using shared memory, in the
>> system. I need to prove that there are no such channels
>> by metering the shared memory and then accounting for
>> every bit shown.
> The customer is confused, and your test is broken as designed.
> The fact that you look in /proc/meminfo and account for every shared
> memory page *at this instant* doesn't mean there isn't a communication
> channel *at some other time*. Even if you run a daemon that does nothing
> but monitor this usage 10 times a second, and complain if a discrepancy
> is found, it *still* won't work:
> 1) It's racy - 2 processes can mmap() some space during that 0.1 seconds,
> transfer the info, and detach the memory without your knowledge.
> 2) It's racy - if you inquire *while* some other process is in some
> intermediate
> state, causing false positives that will drive the SSO nuts.
> The *proper* solution is to use something like SELinux that will flat-out
> *prohibit* the attachment of a shared memory segment that isn't permitted.

The customer is not confused and is, in fact, a known expert.
This is not a "general purpose" setup. There are no executables
except what is burned into R/O PROM. There is no code that can
upload new executables nor any way to execute them. There is no
shell and no init.

There is a startup program called 'init' for convenience, but
whatever it does is hard-coded. It starts a bunch of predefined
tasks and sleeps after performing some initialization.

So, if the executable files are exactly like those which
were reviewed during a security review, and if all
communications between processes can be accounted for,
including shared memory, then it can be guaranteed that
whatever is being executed is exactly what passed the
security review. However, if all communications channels
cannot be accounted for, then it is not possible for such
a guarantee.

It can be argued that, once the executable code is known,
there is no reason to review possible rogue communications
channels. However, the customer is an expert in this field
and requires an audit of all possible communications
channels, including shared memory.

Note that this is an audit. The code for every communications
channel is reviewed. To verify that all such channels are
audited, one needs to find them. For instance even 'vdso' is
audited. These are not continuous audits that operate at
run-time. The reason for this 'static' audit is so that
CPU time eating checks don't have to be done at runtime.

Dick Johnson
Penguin : Linux version on an i686 machine (5589.54 BogoMips).
Warning : 98.36% of all statistics are fiction.

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