Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 30 Jun 2005 12:46:22 -0700 | From | Andrew Morton <> | Subject | Re: FUSE merging? |
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Anton Altaparmakov <aia21@cam.ac.uk> wrote: > > On Thu, 2005-06-30 at 12:20 +0200, Arjan van de Ven wrote: > > On Thu, 2005-06-30 at 12:12 +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > > > > if you are so interested in getting fuse merged... why not merge it > > > > first with the security stuff removed entirely. And then start > > > > discussing putting security stuff back in ? > > > > > > a) it's already been discussed to death (just search for 'fuse' on > > > lkml and fsdevel) > > > > > > b) I don't consider it a good idea to ship a defunct version of it in > > > the mainline > > > > > > Can you please accept my wish to have FUSE merged _with_ the > > > unprivileged mount's thing. > > > > By the same argument: > > Then can you please accept that FUSE will not get merged right now. > > Why should he? IMNSHO it should be merged right now with the security > stuff. FUSE works as is. Without the security stuff FUSE is useless. > > I have yet to read even a single constructive argument why it should not > be merged as is.
I believe that the requirement which fuse_allow_task() attempts to satisfy is legitimate and is useful to FUSE users.
The fact that, AFAIK, nobody as found a way to implement it more nicely is a Linux problem, not a FUSE problem.
Given that the actual amount of code involved is small, centralised and well known about we can easily fix it up later if/when new infrastructure or new ideas become available.
So unless someone is able to come up with a better approach in the next few days I'm inclined to say "we suck" and merge the thing as-is.
However, a few things:
- is there anything in the current implementation of the permission stuff which might tie our hands if it is later reimplemented? IOW: does the current FUSE user interface in any way lock us into the current FUSE implementation (fuse_allow_task())?
- the fuse mount options don't seem to be documented
- aren't we going to remove the nfs semi-server feature?
- Frank points out that a user can send a sigstop to his own setuid(0) task and he intimates that this could cause DoS problems with FUSE. More details needed please?
- I don't recall seeing an exhaustive investigation of how an unprivileged user could use a FUSE mount to implement DoS attacks against other users or against root. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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