[lkml]   [2005]   [May]   [11]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [RCF] [PATCH] unprivileged mount/umount
> > Yes, I see your point.  However the problem of malicious filesystem
> > "traps" applies to private namespaces as well (because of suid
> > programs).
> >
> > So if a user creates a private namespace, it should have the choice of:
> >
> > 1) Giving up all suid rights (i.e. all mounts are cloned and
> > propagated with nosuid)
> >
> > 2) Not giving up suid for cloned and propagated mounts, but having
> > extra limitations (suid/sgid programs cannot access unprivileged
> > "synthetic" mounts)
> Although I hate special cases I think that we might need 2) to avoid too
> much trouble tripping over the global namespace.

I think it should be both. How about a new clone option "CLONE_NOSUID"?

To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to
More majordomo info at
Please read the FAQ at

 \ /
  Last update: 2005-05-11 12:34    [W:0.081 / U:0.024 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site