[lkml]   [2005]   [May]   [11]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [RCF] [PATCH] unprivileged mount/umount
On 5/11/05, Jamie Lokier <> wrote:
> Please read carefully: I've described what _current_ kernels do.

I guess I misread when you wrote:

>>You can't do a lot with the new namespace, because of the security
>>restrictions on mount() on a foreign namespace. That's what I meant
>>about the "small fixes" - get rid of the current->namespace checks and
>>it'll be usable.
>>I don't see the purpose of current->namespace and the associated mount
>>restrictions at all. I asked Al Viro what it's for, but haven't seen
>>a reply :( IMHO current->namespace should simply be removed, because the
>>"current namespace" is represented just fine by

That sounds an awful lot like you want to make changes to the current
support in the kernel.

> It's a poorly understood area of the kernel, and I'm attempting to
> clarify it. This talk of new system calls for entering a namespace
> makes no sense when you can _already_ do some things that people
> haven't realised the kernel does.

IMHO part of the reason its so poorly understood is that people aren't
using it. That's why I suggest we use some of the proposed patches
which open up name space operations to common users. There are some
security checks (like the one brought up justifying the CAP_SYS_ADMIN
permissions on CLONE_NS) that need to be added, before we start
removing others -- and I'm quite concerned that Viro hasn't weighed in
on any of these new patches, I wonder if its because this thread seems
to have gone off the deep end.

To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to
More majordomo info at
Please read the FAQ at

 \ /
  Last update: 2005-05-12 04:22    [W:0.099 / U:29.368 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site