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SubjectRe: [PATCH][RFC] Make /proc/<pid> chmod'able
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On Tue, 2005-03-15 at 00:08 +0100, Bodo Eggert wrote:
> On Mon, 14 Mar 2005, Albert Cahalan wrote:
> > On Mon, 2005-03-14 at 10:42 +0100, Rene Scharfe wrote:
> > > Albert Cahalan wrote:
>
> > > Why do you think users should not be allowed to chmod their processes'
> > > /proc directories? Isn't it similar to being able to chmod their home
> > > directories? They own both objects, after all (both conceptually and as
> > > attributed in the filesystem).
> >
> > This is, to use your own word, "cloaking". This would let
> > a bad user or even an unauthorized user hide from the admin.
>
> NACK, the admin (and with the new inherited capabilities all users with
> cap_???_override) can see all processes. Only users who don't need to know
> won't see the other user's processes.

Capabilities are too broken for most people to use. Normal users
do not get CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE by default anyway, for good reason.

> > Note that the admin hopefully does not normally run as root.
>
> su1 and sudo exist.

This is a pain. Now every user will need sudo access,
and the sudoers file will have to disable requesting
passwords so that scripts will work without hassle.

> > Even if the admin were not running as a normal user, it is
> > expected that normal users can keep tabs on each other.
> > The admin may be sleeping. Social pressure is important to
> > prevent one user from sucking up all the memory and CPU time.
>
> Privacy is important, too. Imagine each user can see the CEO (or the
> admin) executing "ee nakedgirl.jpg".

Obviously, he likes to have users see him do this.
He'd use a private machine if he wanted privacy.

> > > > Note: I'm the procps (ps, top, w, etc.) maintainer.
> > > >
> > > > Probably I'd have to make /bin/ps run setuid root
> > > > to deal with this. (minor changes needed) The same
> > > > goes for /usr/bin/top, which I know is currently
> > > > unsafe and difficult to fix.
>
> I used unpatched procps 3.1.11, and it worked for me, except pstree.

It does not work correctly.

Look, patches with this "feature" are called rootkits.
Think of the headlines: "Linux now with built-in rootkit".

> > > Why do ps and top need to be setuid root to deal with a resticted /proc?
> > > What information in /proc/<pid> needs to be available to any and all
> > > users?
> >
> > Anything provided by traditional UNIX and BSD systems
> > should be available.
>
> e.g. the buffer overflow in sendmail? Or all the open relays? :)
>
> The demands to security and privacy have increased. Linux should be able
> to provide the requested privacy.

This really isn't about security. Privacy may be undesirable.
With privacy comes anti-social behavior. Supposing that the
users do get privacy, perhaps because the have paid for it:

Xen, UML, VM, VMware, separate computers

Going with separate computers is best. Don't forget to use
network traffic control to keep users from being able to
detect the network activity of other users.

> > Users who want privacy can get their
> > own computer. So, these need to work:
> >
> > ps -ef
> > ps -el
> > ps -ej
> > ps axu
> > ps axl
> > ps axj
> > ps axv
> > w
> > top
>
> Works as intended. Only pstree breaks, if init isn't visible.

They work like they do with a rootkit installed.
Traditional behavior has been broken.


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