Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 3 Dec 2005 19:11:40 +0100 | From | Andries Brouwer <> | Subject | Re: security / kbd |
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On Sat, Dec 03, 2005 at 06:19:47PM +0100, Bodo Eggert wrote:
> > But there are many ways of using such a file descriptor. > > This patch cripples the keymap changing but does not solve anything. > > Obviously it solves only a part. OTOH you can't keep an exploit open just > because there is another exploit. > Like I said, use chmod u+s loadkeys.
Hmm. There is an obscure security problem. It was fixed in a bad way - people want to say unicode_start and unicode_stop and find that that fails today. Ach.
You argue "you can't keep an exploit open" - but as far as I can see there is no problem that needs solving in kernel space. For example - today login does a single vhangup() for the login tty. In case that is a VC it could do a vhangup() for all VCs. That looks like a better solution.
And "chmod u+s loadkeys" - you can't be serious.. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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