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SubjectRe: Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer
even requireing a 64k attack to defeat randomization changes an attack 
from N packets to ~45+N packets. This many packets gives a firewall/IDS a
pretty solid signature to use to identify the difference between an attack
and legitiamate traffic, it also gives a reactive IDS system a chance to
terminate the connection before the attack payload (which is in the N
packets) arrives.

David Lang

On Fri, 28 Jan 2005, Ingo Molnar wrote:

> Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2005 06:58:35 +0100
> From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
> To: Jirka Kosina <jikos@jikos.cz>
> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
> akpm@osdl.org, torvalds@osdl.org
> Subject: Re: Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer
>
>
> * Jirka Kosina <jikos@jikos.cz> wrote:
>
>> Also, besides security implications of stack randomization, there is
>> one more aspect that should not be forgotten - stack randomization
>> (even for quite small range) could be useful to distribute a pressure
>> on cache (which may not be fully associative in all cases), so if
>> everyone runs with stack on the same address, it could impose quite
>> noticeable stress on some cachelines (those representing stack
>> addresses), while other will be idling unused.
>>
>> I thought that this was the original purpose of the "stack
>> randomization" which is shipped for example by RedHat kernels, as the
>> randomization is quite small and easy to bruteforce, so it can't serve
>> too much as a buffer overflow protection.
>
> Fedora kernels have 2MB of stack randomization. If 2MB is easy to
> brute-force then 256MB is easy to brute-force nearly as much. But the
> difference between _zero_ randomisation and 2MB randomisation is much
> bigger than the difference between 2MB and 256MB of randomisation.
>
> example: if there is no randomisation and e.g. there's an up to 100
> bytes buffer-overflow in a UDP based service, then a single-packet
> remote attack may become possible, and an automated worm has an easy
> 'vector to spread'. (worms these days are mainly limited by bandwidth,
> so the number of packets it needs to spread is crutial. Also,
> detection/prevention of a worm is easier if the attacker has to send
> multiple packets in a row.)
>
> some quick calculations about how the economics of attack look like if
> there is randomisation in place:
>
> If the hole has a possibility to inject a 'padding invariant' into the
> attack (either NOPs into the shell code, so that a jump address can be
> 'fuzzy', or e.g. "././././" padding into a pathname/URL attack string),
> so that the attack can use a 'fuzzy' address accurate only to the size
> of padding, then the brute-forcing can be reduced to ~2MB/100bytes==20
> thousand tries. If there is randomisation then a single-packet remote
> attack needs to become a ~20-thousand packets brute-force attack. The
> box is by no means in the clear against attacks, but worms become
> uneconomic.
>
> if the attack needs a specific address (or offset) to the stack and
> there is no invariant then 2MB of of randomisation requires 2 million
> tries to do the brute-force-attack.
>
> with 256MB of randomisation and the possibility of an invariant, the
> same attack would become a 2 million packets brute-force attack. A site
> that didnt notice a 10-thousand packets attack probably wont notice a 2
> million packets attack either. Plus the site is still vulnerable: 2
> million packets (which with a 100 bytes attack size takes ~20 minutes
> over broadband) and it's gone.
>
> with no invariant and 256 million packets needed for an attack, it will
> take over a day (over broadband) to brute-force a box - and security
> purists would still consider the box vulnerable.
>
> conclusion: stack randomisation (and other VM randomisations) are not a
> tool against local attacks (which are much easier and faster to
> brute-force) or against targeted remote attacks, but mainly a tool to
> degrade the economy of automated remote attacks.
>
> 256 MB of stack randomisation negatively impacts the VM layout and
> creates all sorts of problems, so it's really impractical. If your only
> goal is to maximize security, then clearly, the more randomisation, the
> better. If you have other goals as well (e.g. my goal is to make
> security as painless as possible, so that _other_ people who dont
> usually care about security end up using our stuff too) then you will
> settle for somewhere inbetween. We started with 8MB in Fedora but that
> already caused some problems so we decreased it to 2MB and that worked
> pretty well on 32-bit systems. 64K is probably too low but is still a
> good start and much better than nothing.
>
> Note that 64-bit systems are different, there we can do a pretty good
> grade of randomisation as VM space is plenty.
>
> Ingo
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