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SubjectRe: [PATCH] OpenBSD Networking-related randomization port
El vie, 28-01-2005 a las 10:18 -0800, Stephen Hemminger escribió:
> This is a very transitory effect, it works only because your machine
> is then different from the typical Linux machine; therefore the scanner
> will go on to the next obvious ones. But if this gets incorporated widely
> then the rarity factor goes away and this defense becomes useless.

I would prefer to say that such "rarity factor" comes directly from the
"rarity factor" given by the PRNG.

So, we should take "rarity factor" as the PRNG seed entropy and not as a
predictable value (not in a reasonable time manner, which is the goal of
most crypto-related developments, to make as much difficult as possible
to cause an information leak, and if such leak happens, ensure that the
information is no longer needed, private, confidential, critical,
whateverelse) (AFAIK).

So, there's no point at that claim.

Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <>
[1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][]
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