[lkml]   [2005]   [Jan]   [28]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: [PATCH] OpenBSD Networking-related randomization port
    El vie, 28-01-2005 a las 10:02 -0800, Stephen Hemminger escribió:
    > > Attached you can find a split up patch ported from grSecurity [1], as
    > > Linus commented that he wouldn't get a whole-sale patch, I was working
    > > on it and also studying what features of grSecurity can be implemented
    > > without a development or maintenance overhead, aka less-invasive
    > > implementations.
    > >
    > > It adds support for advanced networking-related randomization, in
    > > concrete it adds support for TCP ISNs randomization, RPC XIDs
    > > randomization, IP IDs randomization and finally a sub-key under the
    > > Cryptographic options menu for Linux PRNG [2] enhancements (useful now
    > > and also for future patch submissions), which currently has an only-one
    > > option for poll sizes increasing (x2).
    > >
    > > As it's impact is minimal (in performance and development/maintenance
    > > terms), I recommend to merge it, as it gives a basic prevention for the
    > > so-called system fingerprinting (which is used most by "kids" to know
    > > how old and insecure could be a target system, many time used as the
    > > first, even only-one, data to decide if attack or not the target host)
    > > among other things.
    > >
    > > There's only a missing feature that is present on grSecurity, the
    > > sources ports randomization which seems achieved now by some changes
    > > that can be checked out in the Linux BKBits repository:
    > >|src/|src/net|src/net/ipv4|hist/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
    > > (net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c@1.105)
    > >
    > > I'm not sure of the effectiveness of that changes, but I just prefer to
    > > keep it as most simple as possible.If there are thoughts on reverting to
    > > the old schema, and using obsd_rand.c code instead, just drop me a line
    > > and I will modify the patch.
    > Okay, but:
    > * Need to give better explanation of why this is required,
    > existing randomization code in network is compromise between
    > performance and security. So you need to quantify the performance
    > impact of this, and the security threat reduction.

    Performance impact is none AFAIK.
    I've explained them in an early reply to Adrian [1].

    > * Why are the OpenBSD random functions better? because they have more
    > security coolness factor?

    I'm not an OpenBSD user, and no intention to being a one.
    I just recognize that the functions do the same job better, as explained
    in the Kconfig diffs.

    > * It is hard to have two levels of security based on config options.
    > Think of a distro vendor, do they ship the fast or the secure system??
    > As always:
    > * Send networking stuff to

    Added to CC list.

    > * Please split up patches.

    If you talk about removing the pool sizes increasing, then i will do it,
    but i would like to know if this has any chances to get merged.


    Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro <>
    [1024D/6F2B2DEC] & [2048g/9AE91A22][]
    [unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature]
     \ /
      Last update: 2005-03-22 14:09    [W:0.022 / U:45.588 seconds]
    ©2003-2017 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site