Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer | From | Arjan van de Ven <> | Date | Thu, 27 Jan 2005 18:47:30 +0100 |
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On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 12:38 -0500, John Richard Moser wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > > > Arjan van de Ven wrote: > > > > The patch below replaces the existing 8Kb randomisation of the userspace > > stack pointer (which is currently only done for Hyperthreaded P-IVs) with a > > more general randomisation over a 64Kb range. > > > > 64k of stack randomization is trivial to evade.
I think you're focussing on the 64k number WAY too much. Yes it's too small. But it's an initial number to show the infrastructure and get it tested. Yes it should and will be increased later on in the patch series.
Same for the other heap randomisation.
This thing is about getting the infrastructure in place and used. The actual numbers are mere finetuning that can be done near the end.
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