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    SubjectRe: seccomp for 2.6.11-rc1-bk8
    Chris Wright  wrote:
    >Only difference is in number of context switches, and number of running
    >processes (and perhaps ease of determining policy for which syscalls
    >are allowed). Although it's not really seccomp, it's just restricted

    There is a simple tweak to ptrace which fixes that: one could add an
    API to specify a set of syscalls that ptrace should not trap on. To get
    seccomp-like semantics, the user program could specify {read,write}, but
    if the user program ever wants to change its policy, it could change that
    set. Solaris /proc (which is what is used for tracing) has this feature.
    I coded up such an extension to ptrace semantics a long time ago, and
    it seemed to work fine for me, though of course I am not a ptrace expert.

    I don't know whether ptrace + this tweak is a better idea than seccomp.
    It is just another option out there that achieves similar functionality.
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      Last update: 2005-03-22 14:09    [W:0.024 / U:59.316 seconds]
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