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    SubjectRe: thoughts on kernel security issues
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    Linus Torvalds wrote:
    >
    > On Thu, 13 Jan 2005, Alan Cox wrote:
    >
    >>On Iau, 2005-01-13 at 16:38, Linus Torvalds wrote:
    >>

    [...]

    > Am I claiming that disallowing self-written ELF binaries gets rid of all
    > security holes? Obviously not. I'm claiming that there are things that
    > people can do that make it harder, and that _real_ security is not about
    > trusting one subsystem, but in making it hard enough in many independent
    > ways that it's just too effort-intensive to attack.
    >

    I think you can make it non-guaranteeable.

    > It's the same thing with passwords. Clearly any password protected system
    > can be broken into: you just have to guess the password. It then becomes a
    > matter of how hard it is to "guess" - at some point you say a password is
    > secure not because it is a password, but because it's too _expensive_ to
    > guess/break.
    >

    You can't guarantee you can guess a password. You could for example
    write a pam module that mandates a 3 second delay on failed
    authentication for a user (it does it for the console currently; use 3
    separate consoles and you can do the attack 3 times faster). Now you
    have to guess the password with one try every 3 seconds.

    aA1# 96 possible values per character, 8 characters. 7.2139x10^15
    combinations. It takes 686253404.7 years to go through all those at one
    every 3 seconds. You've got a good chance at half that.

    This isn't "hard," it's "infeasible." I think the idea is to make it so
    an attacker doesn't have to put lavish amounts of work into creating an
    exploit that reliably re-exploits a hole over and over again; but to
    make it so he can't make an exploit that actually works, unless it works
    only by rediculously remote chance.

    > So all security issues are about balancing cost vs gain. I'm convinced
    > that the gain from openness is higher than the cost. Others will disagree.
    >

    Yes. Nobody code audits your binaries. You need source code to do
    source code auditing. :)

    > Linus
    > -
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