Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 27 Sep 2004 14:03:53 -0700 | From | Chris Wright <> | Subject | Re: Patch for comment: setuid core dumps |
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* Alan Cox (alan@redhat.com) wrote: > > +suid_dumpable: > + > +This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid > +or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are > + > +0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed > + privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped > +1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is > + owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is > + intended for system debugging situations only.
This looks alright, since it keeps 0 and 1 with same meaning (for any user of prctl).
> +2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally not be dumped is dumped > + readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove > + such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons > + core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or > + other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are > + attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. > +
But, in general, did you double check how this plays with /proc (task_dumpable) and ptrace_attach type stuff? That seems sketchy.
thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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