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SubjectRe: Linux 2.4.27 SECURITY BUG - TCP Local and REMOTE(verified) Denial of Service Attack
On Mon, Sep 13, 2004 at 09:07:41PM +0200, Tonnerre wrote:
> Salut,
> On Mon, Sep 13, 2004 at 06:18:47AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> > > The BGP state machine should instead, in normal operation, have
> > > only treated Hold time expired as the definitive sign of "peer is
> > > down" and allowed reconnects.
> >
> > It should not necessarily wait for the time-out, but at least wait for
> > a few reconnect errors.
> Problem there: you can fake connection errors almost as easily as
> sending an RST packet, so the DoS might reappear, might it not?

No, as long as you don't keep the routes from the old session until the
new one establishes and fills up (or you reach the timeout). And when I
spoke about "connection errors", I really spoke about connection
establishment. I bet you'll have more difficulties trying to send the
right RST just after a SYN (or an ICMP unreachable with the right payload)
than sending them once the session is already established. It does make
a big difference.


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