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SubjectRe: SG_IO and security


On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, Alan Cox wrote:
> > >
> > > Hmm.. This still allows the old "junk" commands (SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND).
>
> That uses sg_io() so gets caught as well unless I screwed up following
> the code paths.

No, while the cdrom_ioctl thing does use sg_io, the really old and
horrible sg_scsi_ioctl thing does it's own commands by hand.

I don't know why. I get the feeling that it _should_ use sg_io().

> With the current code I can destroy all your hard disks given read
> access to the drive.

Oh, I clearly agree with you that something had to be done. Which is why I
did an extended version of your patch already.

> Do we
>
> a) Have code that essentially says "if read on base device can do ....,
> if write can do ... , else capable(...)"
>
> b) ioctls/other command functionality for the stuff users should be
> allowed to do.
>
> Option (a) means parsing command blocks which are pretty regular and
> parseable.

Yes. I think we should do:
- harmless read-only commands that we know, we allow for read opens
- harmless write-only commands that we know, we allow for write opens
- commands we don't know, or commands that aren't harmless, we require
RAWIO-capability for.

That seems fairly trivial to implement, and is clearly the user-friendly
thing to do. The quick patch is just too damn unfriendly.

Linus
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