Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Thu, 12 Aug 2004 22:22:36 +0300 (EEST) | | From | Kai Makisara <> | | Subject | Re: SG_IO and security |
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On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > > On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, Jeff Garzik wrote: > > > > Linus Torvalds wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, Linus Torvalds wrote: > > > > > >>Hmm.. This still allows the old "junk" commands (SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND). > > > > > > > > > Btw, I think the _right_ thing to check is the write access of the file > > > descriptor. If you have write access to a block device, you can delete the > > > data, so you might as well be able to do the raw commands. And that would > > > allow things like "disk" groups etc to work and burn CD's. > > > > Define raw commands. I certainly don't want non-root users to be able > > to issue FORMAT UNIT on my hard drive. > > Ehh? The same ones you allow to write all over the raw device? > > Let's see now: > > brw-rw---- 1 root disk 3, 0 Jan 30 2003 /dev/hda > > would you put people you don't trust with your disk in the "disk" group? > This protects disks in practice but SG_IO is currently supported by other devices, at least SCSI tapes. It is reasonable in some organizations to give r/w access to ordinary users so that they can read/write tapes. I would be worried if this would enable the users, for instance, to mess up the mode page contents of the drive or change the firmware.
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