Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH] Delete cryptoloop | Date | Mon, 26 Jul 2004 14:45:26 +0200 | From | Fruhwirth Clemens <> |
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On Mon, 2004-07-26 at 12:54, Jari Ruusu wrote: > Fruhwirth Clemens wrote: > > On Sun, 2004-07-25 at 19:25, Jari Ruusu wrote: > > > In short: exploit encodes watermark patterns as sequences of identical > > > ciphertexts. > > > > Probably I'm missing the point, but at the moment this looks like a > > chosen plain text attack. As you know for sure, this is trivial. For > > instance, AES asserts to be secure against this kind of attack. (See the > > author's definition of K-secure..). > > > I'm suggesting it doesn't work at all. > > Fruhwirth, your incompetence has always amazed me. And this time is no > exception. What is conserning is that some mainline folks seem to listening > to your ill opinions. No wonder that both mainline device crypto > implementations are such a joke.
Please don't resort to personal defamations.
To summarize for an innocent bystander:
- The attacks you brought forward are in the best case a starting point for known plain text attacks. Even DES is secure against this attack, since an attacker would need 2^47 chosen plain texts to break the cipher via differential cryptanalysis. (Table 12.14 Applied Cryptography, Schneier). First, the watermark attack can only distinguish 32 watermarks. Second, you'd need a ~2.000.000 GB to store 2^47 chosen plain texts. Third, I'm talking about DES (designed 1977!), no chance against AES.
- The weaknesses brought forward by me are summarized at http://clemens.endorphin.org/OnTheProblemsOfCryptoloop . Thanks goes to Pascal Brisset, who pointed out that cryptoloop is actually more secure than I assumed.
If you, Jari, have any arguments left, it's time to state them now. Otherwise, have a nice day, -- Fruhwirth Clemens <clemens@endorphin.org> http://clemens.endorphin.org [unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature] | |