Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 15 May 2004 01:00:43 +0100 (IST) | From | Paul Jakma <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 0/2] capabilities |
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On Wed, 12 May 2004, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> Like something that turns KEEPCAPS on then setuid()s then executes > an untrusted program? It's obviously wrong, but it's secure > currently since the exec wipes capabilities. And no one would > notice. Ugh!
Definitely wrong.
> The prctl would defeat the purpose (imagine if bash forgot the > prctl -- then the whole thing is pointless).
Capabilities aware programmes are most likely already setting PR_SET_KEEPCAPS anyway if they're doing anything half-fancy. Another prctl() wont hurt too much if it is the only way to guarantee backward compatible security (?).
regards, -- Paul Jakma paul@clubi.ie paul@jakma.org Key ID: 64A2FF6A warning: do not ever send email to spam@dishone.st Fortune: "I go on working for the same reason a hen goes on laying eggs." - H. L. Mencken - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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