Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 30 Mar 2004 12:15:07 -0500 | From | Jeff Garzik <> | Subject | Re: "Enhanced" MD code avaible for review |
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Justin T. Gibbs wrote: > The dm-raid1 module also appears to intrinsicly trust its mapping and the > contents of its meta-data (simple magic number check). It seems to me that > the kernel should validate all of its inputs regardless of whether the > ioctls that are used to present them are only supposed to be used by a > "trusted daemon".
The kernel should not be validating -trusted- userland inputs. Root is allowed to scrag the disk, violate limits, and/or crash his own machine.
A simple example is requiring userland, when submitting ATA taskfiles via an ioctl, to specify the data phase (pio read, dma write, no-data, etc.). If the data phase is specified incorrectly, you kill the OS driver's ATA host state machine, and the results are very unpredictable. Since this is a trusted operation, requiring CAP_RAW_IO, it's up to userland to get the required details right (just like following a spec).
> I honestly don't care if the final solution is EMD, DM, or XYZ so long > as that solution is correct, supportable, and covers all of the scenarios > required for robust RAID support. That is the crux of the argument, not > "please love my code".
hehe. I think we all agree here...
Jeff
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