Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 11 Mar 2004 11:02:45 -0500 | Subject | Re: UID/GID mapping system | From | "J. Bruce Fields" <> |
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On Thu, Mar 11, 2004 at 08:08:31AM -0600, Jesse Pollard wrote: > On Wednesday 10 March 2004 17:46, Andreas Dilger wrote: > > If the client is trusted to mount NFS, then it is also trusted enough not > > to use the wrong UID. There is no "more" or "less" safe in this regard. > > It is only trusted to not misuse the uids that are mapped for that client. If > the client DOES misuse the uids, then only those mapped uids will be affected. > UIDS that are not mapped for that host will be protected. > > It is to ISOLATE the penetration to the host that this is done. The server > will not and should not extend trust to any uid not authorized to that host. > This is what the UID/GID maps on the server provide.
You're making an argument that uid mapping on the server could be used to provide additional security; I agree.
I don't believe you can argue, however, that providing uid mapping on the client would *decrease* security, unless you believe that mapping uid's on the client precludes also mapping uid's on the server.
--Bruce Fields - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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