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SubjectRe: [PATCH] Call security hook from pid*_revalidate
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On Wed, 2003-08-20 at 10:56, OGAWA Hirofumi wrote:
> Umm.. Wasn't the following needed?
>
> inode->i_uid = 0;
> inode->i_gid = 0;
> if (ino == PROC_PID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) {

Yes, good catch. That's an omission from the original
proc-pid-setuid-ownership-fix.patch, not mine. How about the patch
below, against 2.6.0-test3-mm3, which both addresses the omission from
the original patch and adds the security hook call. Note that the
security hook call is still unconditional, as in proc_pid_make_inode;
the security module can decide how it wants to deal with non-dumpable
tasks when setting the inode security field.

diff -X /home/sds/dontdiff -ru linux-2.6.0-test3-mm3/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.0-test3-mm3-sds/fs/proc/base.c
--- linux-2.6.0-test3-mm3/fs/proc/base.c 2003-08-21 16:24:17.469096884 -0400
+++ linux-2.6.0-test3-mm3-sds/fs/proc/base.c 2003-08-21 16:09:40.000000000 -0400
@@ -870,11 +870,17 @@
*/
static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
- if (pid_alive(proc_task(dentry->d_inode))) {
- struct task_struct *task = proc_task(dentry->d_inode);
-
- dentry->d_inode->i_uid = task->euid;
- dentry->d_inode->i_gid = task->egid;
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct task_struct *task = proc_task(inode);
+ if (pid_alive(task)) {
+ int ino = inode->i_ino & 0xffff;
+ inode->i_uid = 0;
+ inode->i_gid = 0;
+ if (ino == PROC_PID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) {
+ inode->i_uid = task->euid;
+ inode->i_gid = task->egid;
+ }
+ security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
return 1;
}
d_drop(dentry);
@@ -883,8 +889,9 @@

static int pid_fd_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
- struct task_struct *task = proc_task(dentry->d_inode);
- int fd = proc_type(dentry->d_inode) - PROC_PID_FD_DIR;
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct task_struct *task = proc_task(inode);
+ int fd = proc_type(inode) - PROC_PID_FD_DIR;
struct files_struct *files;

task_lock(task);
@@ -895,10 +902,16 @@
if (files) {
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
if (fcheck_files(files, fd)) {
+ int ino = inode->i_ino & 0xffff;
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
put_files_struct(files);
- dentry->d_inode->i_uid = task->euid;
- dentry->d_inode->i_gid = task->egid;
+ inode->i_uid = 0;
+ inode->i_gid = 0;
+ if (ino == PROC_PID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) {
+ inode->i_uid = task->euid;
+ inode->i_gid = task->egid;
+ }
+ security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
return 1;
}
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);

--
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
National Security Agency

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