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Subject[Numbers][PATCH] Make cryptoapi non-optional?
On Sun, Aug 10, 2003 at 09:54:22PM -0700, David S. Miller wrote:
> There is no reason why random.c's usage of the crypto-API cannot be
> done cleanly and efficiently such that it is both faster and resulting
> in smaller code size than what random.c uses now. All of this _WITHOUT_
> bypassing and compromising the well designed crypto API interfaces to these
> transformations.

Alright, here's the current state of this, with some numbers to back
it up. Below is my current random -> cryptoapi patch, which sets up
per-cpu crypto tfms at init time and is fairly straightforward. Would
be nice if it didn't block preemption while hashing but that's a
general downside of anything per_cpu. It applies on top of a bunch of
other small stuff that I'll get around to posting eventually. But this
should be enough for discussion.

I built three 2.6.0-test3-mm1 kernels with gcc 3.3.1 for my Athlon:

native - current /dev/random SHA1 plus some WIP, no cryptoapi
unrolled - /dev/random modified to use cryptoapi's unrolled SHA1
with its own SHA code dropped
rolled - like unrolled but with a cryptoapi SHA1 implementation as
close to the original as reasonable

text data bss dec hex filename bandwidth code data
2413597 477694 157224 3048515 2e8443 native 17.6MB/s 1906 594
2421648 478951 157224 3057823 2ea89f rolled 14.0MB/s 1913 599
2427280 478944 157224 3063448 2ebe98 unrolled 17.5MB/s 1918 598

(bandwidth here is 'cat /dev/random | pipeview > /dev/null')
So the size penalty for cryptoapi in itself looks to be about 8k+5k
currently. Going to the unrolled SHA1 costs another 5k(!).

I also built a couple custom kernels to let me calculate the overhead
of various parts of the process and the raw algorithm speed.

1/o = Null /dev/urandom hash function = 60.3MB/s
1/(o+c) = Null cryptoapi hash function = 32.9MB/s

This lets us calculate:

1/c = cryptoapi null through (aka overhead)= 72.4MB/s (mostly memcpy?)
1/n = native SHA1 implementation = 24.9MB/s
1/r = "rolled" cryptoapi SHA1 - overhead = 24.4MB/s (extra memset)
1/u = unrolled SHA1 in cryptoapi - overhead= 37.4MB/s

So unrolled is about 50% faster and looking at the size of the .o
files (2.2 vs 7.8k), almost 4 times bigger. And about a third of the
time spent hashing with the cryptoapi is bookkeeping and buffering
overhead.

So we've got a few ways to proceed:

a) keep two copies of SHA around
b) cryptoapi+sha become non-optional (+optional rolled version)
c) somebody exports raw SHA transform and cryptoapi stays optional

(The big downside of c) is we won't be able to easily plugin different
transforms)

diff -urN -X dontdiff orig/drivers/char/mem.c work/drivers/char/mem.c
--- orig/drivers/char/mem.c 2003-07-13 22:34:32.000000000 -0500
+++ work/drivers/char/mem.c 2003-08-12 21:18:51.000000000 -0500
@@ -680,7 +680,6 @@
S_IFCHR | devlist[i].mode, devlist[i].name);
}

- rand_initialize();
#if defined (CONFIG_FB)
fbmem_init();
#endif
diff -urN -X dontdiff orig/drivers/char/random.c work/drivers/char/random.c
--- orig/drivers/char/random.c 2003-08-12 21:18:53.000000000 -0500
+++ work/drivers/char/random.c 2003-08-12 21:22:01.000000000 -0500
@@ -249,11 +249,16 @@
#include <linux/genhd.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>

#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <asm/scatterlist.h>

/*
* Configuration information
@@ -360,7 +365,7 @@
* modulo the generator polymnomial. Now, for random primitive polynomials,
* this is a universal class of hash functions, meaning that the chance
* of a collision is limited by the attacker's knowledge of the generator
- * polynomail, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force
+ * polynomial, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force
* a collision. Here, we use a fixed polynomial, but we *can* assume that
* ###--> it is unknown to the processes generating the input entropy. <-###
* Because of this important property, this is a good, collision-resistant
@@ -374,6 +379,8 @@
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);

+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crypto_tfm *, sha_tfm);
+
/*
* Forward procedure declarations
*/
@@ -775,122 +782,6 @@
add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100+MKDEV(disk->major, disk->first_minor));
}

-/******************************************************************
- *
- * Hash function definition
- *
- *******************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * This chunk of code defines a function
- * void SHATransform(__u32 digest[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE],
- * __u32 const data[16])
- *
- * The function hashes the input data to produce a digest in the first
- * HASH_BUFFER_SIZE words of the digest[] array, and uses HASH_EXTRA_SIZE
- * more words for internal purposes. (This buffer is exported so the
- * caller can wipe it once rather than this code doing it each call,
- * and tacking it onto the end of the digest[] array is the quick and
- * dirty way of doing it.)
- *
- * For /dev/random purposes, the length of the data being hashed is
- * fixed in length, so appending a bit count in the usual way is not
- * cryptographically necessary.
- */
-
-#define HASH_BUFFER_SIZE 5
-#define HASH_EXTRA_SIZE 80
-
-/*
- * SHA transform algorithm, taken from code written by Peter Gutmann,
- * and placed in the public domain.
- */
-
-/* The SHA f()-functions. */
-
-#define f1(x,y,z) ( z ^ (x & (y^z)) ) /* Rounds 0-19: x ? y : z */
-#define f2(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) /* Rounds 20-39: XOR */
-#define f3(x,y,z) ( (x & y) + (z & (x ^ y)) ) /* Rounds 40-59: majority */
-#define f4(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) /* Rounds 60-79: XOR */
-
-/* The SHA Mysterious Constants */
-
-#define K1 0x5A827999L /* Rounds 0-19: sqrt(2) * 2^30 */
-#define K2 0x6ED9EBA1L /* Rounds 20-39: sqrt(3) * 2^30 */
-#define K3 0x8F1BBCDCL /* Rounds 40-59: sqrt(5) * 2^30 */
-#define K4 0xCA62C1D6L /* Rounds 60-79: sqrt(10) * 2^30 */
-
-#define ROTL(n,X) ( ( ( X ) << n ) | ( ( X ) >> ( 32 - n ) ) )
-
-#define subRound(a, b, c, d, e, f, k, data) \
- ( e += ROTL( 5, a ) + f( b, c, d ) + k + data, b = ROTL( 30, b ) )
-
-
-static void SHATransform(__u32 digest[85], __u32 const data[16])
-{
- __u32 A, B, C, D, E; /* Local vars */
- __u32 TEMP;
- int i;
-#define W (digest + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE) /* Expanded data array */
-
- /*
- * Do the preliminary expansion of 16 to 80 words. Doing it
- * out-of-line line like this is faster than doing it in-line on
- * register-starved machines like the x86, and not really any
- * slower on real processors.
- */
- memcpy(W, data, 16*sizeof(__u32));
- for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
- TEMP = W[i] ^ W[i+2] ^ W[i+8] ^ W[i+13];
- W[i+16] = ROTL(1, TEMP);
- }
-
- /* Set up first buffer and local data buffer */
- A = digest[ 0 ];
- B = digest[ 1 ];
- C = digest[ 2 ];
- D = digest[ 3 ];
- E = digest[ 4 ];
-
- /* Heavy mangling, in 4 sub-rounds of 20 iterations each. */
- for (i = 0; i < 80; i++) {
- if (i < 40) {
- if (i < 20)
- TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1;
- else
- TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2;
- } else {
- if (i < 60)
- TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3;
- else
- TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4;
- }
- TEMP += ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
- E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
- }
-
- /* Build message digest */
- digest[ 0 ] += A;
- digest[ 1 ] += B;
- digest[ 2 ] += C;
- digest[ 3 ] += D;
- digest[ 4 ] += E;
-
- /* W is wiped by the caller */
-#undef W
-}
-
-#undef ROTL
-#undef f1
-#undef f2
-#undef f3
-#undef f4
-#undef K1
-#undef K2
-#undef K3
-#undef K4
-#undef subRound
-
/*********************************************************************
*
* Entropy extraction routines
@@ -899,8 +790,6 @@

#define EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER 1
#define EXTRACT_ENTROPY_LIMIT 2
-#define TMP_BUF_SIZE (HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE)
-#define SEC_XFER_SIZE (TMP_BUF_SIZE*4)

static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void * buf,
size_t nbytes, int flags);
@@ -912,7 +801,7 @@
*/
static void reseed_pool(struct entropy_store *r, int margin, int wanted)
{
- __u32 tmp[TMP_BUF_SIZE];
+ __u32 tmp[32]; /* 256 bits */
int bytes;

DEBUG_ENT("reseed %s wants %d bits (margin %d)\n",
@@ -948,9 +837,10 @@
size_t nbytes, int flags)
{
ssize_t ret, i, pos;
- __u32 tmp[TMP_BUF_SIZE];
- __u32 x;
unsigned long cpuflags;
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ __u32 hash[5]; /* 160 bits */

/* Hold lock while accounting */
spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, cpuflags);
@@ -986,18 +876,15 @@
}

DEBUG_ENT("extract sleep (%d bytes left)\n", nbytes);
-
schedule();
-
DEBUG_ENT("extract wake\n");
}

- /* Hash the pool to get the output */
- tmp[0] = 0x67452301;
- tmp[1] = 0xefcdab89;
- tmp[2] = 0x98badcfe;
- tmp[3] = 0x10325476;
- tmp[4] = 0xc3d2e1f0;
+ /* Pick a position in the pool to hash from */
+ pos = r->pos;
+ if(pos > r->poolinfo->poolwords - 15)
+ pos=0;
+ r->pos = pos + 1;

/* Pick a position in the pool to hash from */
pos = r->pos;
@@ -1015,26 +902,32 @@
* backtrack prevention over catastrophic reseeding.
*/

- SHATransform(tmp, r->pool + pos);
- add_entropy_words(r, tmp, HASH_BUFFER_SIZE);
+ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(r->pool + pos);
+ sg[0].offset = ((long)(r->pool + pos) & ~PAGE_MASK);
+ /* avoid padding overhead in cryptoapi */
+ sg[0].length = 56;
+ tfm=get_cpu_var(sha_tfm);
+ crypto_digest_digest(tfm, sg, 1, (char *)hash);
+ put_cpu_var(sha_tfm);
+ add_entropy_words(r, hash, 5);

/* Copy data to destination buffer */
- i = min(nbytes, HASH_BUFFER_SIZE*sizeof(__u32));
+ i = min(nbytes, sizeof(hash));
if (flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER) {
- i -= copy_to_user(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
+ i -= copy_to_user(buf, (__u8 const *)hash, i);
if (!i) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
} else
- memcpy(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
+ memcpy(buf, (__u8 const *)hash, i);
nbytes -= i;
buf += i;
ret += i;
}

/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
- memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+ memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));

return ret;
}
@@ -1093,7 +986,25 @@
}
}

-void __init rand_initialize(void)
+static int random_cpu_notify(struct notifier_block *self,
+ unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
+{
+ if (action == CPU_UP_PREPARE)
+ {
+ per_cpu(sha_tfm, (long)hcpu) = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha1", 0);
+
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "random cpu %ld sha_tfm = %p\n",
+ (long)hcpu, per_cpu(sha_tfm, (long)hcpu));
+ }
+
+ return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block random_nb = {
+ .notifier_call = random_cpu_notify,
+};
+
+static int __init init_random(void)
{
int i;

@@ -1103,10 +1014,14 @@
"nonblocking");

if(!(input_pool && blocking_pool && nonblocking_pool))
- return;
+ return -ENOMEM;

- if(batch_entropy_init(BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE))
- return;
+ if((i=batch_entropy_init(BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE)) != 0)
+ return i;
+
+ random_cpu_notify(&random_nb, (unsigned long)CPU_UP_PREPARE,
+ (void *)(long)smp_processor_id());
+ register_cpu_notifier(&random_nb);

init_std_data(input_pool);
sysctl_init_random(input_pool);
@@ -1115,8 +1030,12 @@
irq_timer_state[i] = NULL;
memset(&keyboard_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
memset(&mouse_timer_state, 0, sizeof(struct timer_rand_state));
+
+ return 0;
}

+__initcall(init_random);
+
void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
{
struct timer_rand_state *state;
@@ -1153,15 +1072,10 @@
static ssize_t
random_read(struct file * file, char * buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
- ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;
+ ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;

- if (nbytes == 0)
- return 0;
-
while (nbytes > 0) {
- n = nbytes;
- if (n > SEC_XFER_SIZE)
- n = SEC_XFER_SIZE;
+ n = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLOCKING_POOL_SIZE/8);

/* We can take all the entropy in the input pool */
reseed_pool(blocking_pool, 0, n);
@@ -1839,13 +1753,16 @@
#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)

static int syncookie_init;
-static __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-3+HASH_BUFFER_SIZE];
+static __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-3];

__u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
__u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 data)
{
- __u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
- __u32 seq;
+ __u32 tmp[16]; /* 512 bits */
+ __u32 hash[5]; /* 160 bits */
+ __u32 seq;
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];

/*
* Pick two random secrets the first time we need a cookie.
@@ -1866,22 +1783,27 @@
* MSS into the second hash value.
*/

- memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
+ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(tmp);
+ sg[0].offset = ((long) tmp & ~PAGE_MASK);
+ sg[0].length = sizeof(tmp);
+
tmp[0]=saddr;
tmp[1]=daddr;
tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
- SHATransform(tmp+16, tmp);
- seq = tmp[17] + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS);
+
+ memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
+ tfm = get_cpu_var(sha_tfm);
+ crypto_digest_digest(tfm, sg, 1, (char *)hash);
+
+ seq = hash[1] + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS);

memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
- tmp[0]=saddr;
- tmp[1]=daddr;
- tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
tmp[3] = count; /* minute counter */
- SHATransform(tmp+16, tmp);
+ crypto_digest_digest(tfm, sg, 1, (char *)hash);
+ put_cpu_var(sha_tfm);

/* Add in the second hash and the data */
- return seq + ((tmp[17] + data) & COOKIEMASK);
+ return seq + ((hash[1] + data) & COOKIEMASK);
}

/*
@@ -1896,19 +1818,30 @@
__u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
__u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
{
- __u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
- __u32 diff;
+ __u32 tmp[16]; /* 512 bits */
+ __u32 hash[5]; /* 160 bits */
+ __u32 diff;
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];

if (syncookie_init == 0)
return (__u32)-1; /* Well, duh! */

- /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
- memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
+ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(tmp);
+ sg[0].offset = ((long) tmp & ~PAGE_MASK);
+ sg[0].length = sizeof(tmp);
+
tmp[0]=saddr;
tmp[1]=daddr;
tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
- SHATransform(tmp+16, tmp);
- cookie -= tmp[17] + sseq;
+
+ /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
+ memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
+ tfm = get_cpu_var(sha_tfm);
+ crypto_digest_digest(tfm, sg, 1, (char *)hash);
+ put_cpu_var(sha_tfm);
+
+ cookie -= hash[1] + sseq;
/* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */

diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32)-1 >> COOKIEBITS);
@@ -1916,13 +1849,12 @@
return (__u32)-1;

memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
- tmp[0] = saddr;
- tmp[1] = daddr;
- tmp[2] = (sport << 16) + dport;
tmp[3] = count - diff; /* minute counter */
- SHATransform(tmp+16, tmp);
+ tfm = get_cpu_var(sha_tfm);
+ crypto_digest_digest(tfm, sg, 1, (char *)hash);
+ put_cpu_var(sha_tfm);

- return (cookie - tmp[17]) & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
+ return (cookie - hash[1]) & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
}
#endif


--
Matt Mackall : http://www.selenic.com : of or relating to the moon
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