Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 11 Jul 2003 21:04:53 +0200 (CEST) | From | Mikulas Patocka <> | Subject | Re: Sound updating, security of strlcpy and a question on pci v unload |
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> I'm currently updating the prehistoric OSS audio code in 2.5 to include > all the new 2.4 drivers and 2.4 work. While some of them overlap ALSA > drivers others are not in ALSA yet either. > > Firstly someone turned half the kernel into using strlcpy. Every single > change I looked at bar two in the sound layer introduced a security > hole. It looks like whoever did it just fired up a perl macro without > realising the strncpy properties matter for data copied to user space. > Looks like the rest wants auditing
What's the difference there? strlcpy always creates null-terminated string, strncpy doesn't. strncpy in kernel (unlike user strncpy) does not pad the whole destination buffer with zeros (see comment and implementation in lib/string.c), so I don't see any point why strncpy should be more secure.
Mikulas
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