[lkml]   [2003]   [May]   [13]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: [PATCH] in-core AFS multiplexor and PAG support

    > Right, if some process/user opens a file and then passes the descriptor
    > to another process/user which closes it. The close should operate under
    > the same permissions as the original opener.

    As long as the token isn't explicitly withdrawn. With my token structure, I've
    defined it such that if the list_head in the token struct is ever empty, then
    the token is withdrawn.

    Furthermore, I'm considering it such that the the filesystem will select a
    token from the PAG's token ring in the file_operations->open method and will
    attach it to the file->f_token at that point for quick reference later.

    > If someone obtains my user id on in any way (i.e. weak password/
    > bufferoverflow/ root exploit), he should not be allowed to use or access
    > my tokens as he hasn't proven his identity. In this case he would either
    > still be in his original process authentication group, or a new and
    > empty PAG. But definitely not in any of my authentication groups.
    > Which is also why joining a PAG should never be allowed.

    Someone asked for it, but I suspect if allowed at all it may be best that this
    ability is governed by its own capability bit and also that the security
    interface should be consulted.

    To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
    the body of a message to
    More majordomo info at
    Please read the FAQ at

     \ /
      Last update: 2005-03-22 13:35    [W:0.020 / U:186.100 seconds]
    ©2003-2016 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site