Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 24 Nov 2003 12:54:49 -0800 | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Subject | Re: hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems |
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Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> > In any case, if a user is *MAKING* a program set-UID, it's probably because > he *wants* it to run as himself even if others invoke it (otherwise, he > could just leave it in ~/bin and be happy). So this is really a red herring, > as it's only a problem if (a) he decides to get rid of the binary, and fails > to do so because of hard links he doesn't know about, or (b) he's an idiot > programmer and it malfunctions if invoked with an odd argv[0]....
Right... but non-privileged users _can't_ delete these extra links, even if they notice them from the link count. And non-idiots do make security errors -- they just fix them. But in this case, fixing the error after the fact may be impossible without root's help.
And how many package managers / install scripts check for hard links of files they're about to overwrite?
--Andy
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