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SubjectRe: hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems wrote:

> In any case, if a user is *MAKING* a program set-UID, it's probably because
> he *wants* it to run as himself even if others invoke it (otherwise, he
> could just leave it in ~/bin and be happy). So this is really a red herring,
> as it's only a problem if (a) he decides to get rid of the binary, and fails
> to do so because of hard links he doesn't know about, or (b) he's an idiot
> programmer and it malfunctions if invoked with an odd argv[0]....

Right... but non-privileged users _can't_ delete these extra links, even
if they notice them from the link count. And non-idiots do make
security errors -- they just fix them. But in this case, fixing the
error after the fact may be impossible without root's help.

And how many package managers / install scripts check for hard links of
files they're about to overwrite?


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