Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 29 Jan 2003 19:37:50 +0000 | From | Russell King <> | Subject | Re: kernel.org frontpage |
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On Wed, Jan 29, 2003 at 01:55:22PM -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote: > Yes, an intruder could leave a forged signature with a random key > easily. But to leave a forged signature with the key that's already > on my keyring is a lot harder...
I believe a script signs the files on ftp.kernel.org, which means the private key is on the master machine, probably without a pass phrase. That means that if the master server is compromised, its highly likely that a rogue file will have a correct signature.
As hpa says, the GPG signature provides no assurance that Linus put up patch-2.5.60.bz2 and not some random other person.
The only way to be completely sure is for Linus to gpg-sign the patches himself at source with a known gpg key using a secure pass phrase before they leave his machine (preferably before the machine is connected to the 'net to upload them for the really paranoid.)
-- Russell King (rmk@arm.linux.org.uk) The developer of ARM Linux http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html
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