Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Sun, 1 Sep 2002 16:08:05 -0700 | From | Chris Wright <> | Subject | Re: extended file permissions based on LSM |
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* Daniel Phillips (phillips@arcor.de) wrote: > On Sunday 01 September 2002 02:26, Chris Wright wrote: > > * Ingo Oeser (ingo.oeser@informatik.tu-chemnitz.de) wrote: > > > > > > So this is a correctly pointed out design weakness: The way the > > > user took to reach the inode cannot be taken into account. > > > > Yes, this is known, and there are anticipated VFS changes to remedy > > this. > > Could you describe them, please?
For example, passing vfsmount/dentry pair to i_op->permission(). getattr() is already done, and last I heard I Al intends to do setattr() as well.
thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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