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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] (0/4) Entropy accounting fixes
    Quoting Linus Torvalds <torvalds@transmeta.com>:

    > Be realistic. This is what I ask of you. We want _real_world_ security,
    > not a completely made-up-example-for-the-NSA-that-is-useless-to-anybody-
    > else.
    >
    > All your arguments seem to boil down to "people shouldn't use /dev/random
    > at all, they should use /dev/urandom".

    Wouldn't it be much easier to ask -very few- people (GnuPG/SSL/SSH teams
    primarily) to use /dev/super-reliable-mathematically-proven-random if
    available, instead of asking much larger crowd to hack their code? This
    will be backward compatible, and at the same time offers a much better
    randomness for those who care about it. Myself, I read 128-bit session
    keys for multiple, not-so-secure, short connections from /dev/random and
    it would be sad if it runs out of data.

    Also, /dev/random may take data from /dev/super-...random until it sucks
    it dry, and then switches to less secure sources. This will guarantee that
    the enthropy of readings is -not worse than-, and for moderate requests is
    much better.

    Dmitri

    --
    16. The Evil Overlord will not risk his life to save yours. Why risk
    yours for his?
    ("Evil Overlord" by Peter Anspach and John VanSickl)
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