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SubjectRe: [PATCH] (0/4) Entropy accounting fixes
Quoting Linus Torvalds <torvalds@transmeta.com>:

> Be realistic. This is what I ask of you. We want _real_world_ security,
> not a completely made-up-example-for-the-NSA-that-is-useless-to-anybody-
> else.
>
> All your arguments seem to boil down to "people shouldn't use /dev/random
> at all, they should use /dev/urandom".

Wouldn't it be much easier to ask -very few- people (GnuPG/SSL/SSH teams
primarily) to use /dev/super-reliable-mathematically-proven-random if
available, instead of asking much larger crowd to hack their code? This
will be backward compatible, and at the same time offers a much better
randomness for those who care about it. Myself, I read 128-bit session
keys for multiple, not-so-secure, short connections from /dev/random and
it would be sad if it runs out of data.

Also, /dev/random may take data from /dev/super-...random until it sucks
it dry, and then switches to less secure sources. This will guarantee that
the enthropy of readings is -not worse than-, and for moderate requests is
much better.

Dmitri

--
16. The Evil Overlord will not risk his life to save yours. Why risk
yours for his?
("Evil Overlord" by Peter Anspach and John VanSickl)
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