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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] (0/4) Entropy accounting fixes
    Quoting Linus Torvalds <>:

    > Be realistic. This is what I ask of you. We want _real_world_ security,
    > not a completely made-up-example-for-the-NSA-that-is-useless-to-anybody-
    > else.
    > All your arguments seem to boil down to "people shouldn't use /dev/random
    > at all, they should use /dev/urandom".

    Wouldn't it be much easier to ask -very few- people (GnuPG/SSL/SSH teams
    primarily) to use /dev/super-reliable-mathematically-proven-random if
    available, instead of asking much larger crowd to hack their code? This
    will be backward compatible, and at the same time offers a much better
    randomness for those who care about it. Myself, I read 128-bit session
    keys for multiple, not-so-secure, short connections from /dev/random and
    it would be sad if it runs out of data.

    Also, /dev/random may take data from /dev/super-...random until it sucks
    it dry, and then switches to less secure sources. This will guarantee that
    the enthropy of readings is -not worse than-, and for moderate requests is
    much better.


    16. The Evil Overlord will not risk his life to save yours. Why risk
    yours for his?
    ("Evil Overlord" by Peter Anspach and John VanSickl)
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