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    SubjectRe: Filesystem Capabilities in 2.6?


    On Sat, 2 Nov 2002, Linus Torvalds wrote:

    > On the other hand, I have this suspicion that the most secure setup is one
    > that the sysadmin is _used_ to, and knows all the pitfalls of. Which
    > obviously is a big argument for just maintaining the status quo with suid
    > binaries.
    >
    > We have decades of knowledge on how to minimize the negative impact of
    > suid (I've used sendmail as an example of a suid program, and yet last I
    > looked sendmail was actually pretty careful about dropping all unnecessary
    > privileges very early on).

    Quite so. Now, ability to _remove_ capabilities on exec() is a Good Thing(tm)
    regardless of suid. It can be combined with suid - that gives you something
    that is still evil, but less than it used to be. But I don't see any point
    in new independent mechanism for raising caps - e.g. since it assumes a
    bunch of new programs that were written to run with elevated caps and
    with assumption that they will be less dangerous than suid-root ones.
    Somehow, it doesn't make me happy about running such programs - not for
    first 5 years or so.

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